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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
INGA-LILL ELTON,

Respondent,
Plaintiff-

vs.
UT AH ST ATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
an agency of the STA TE OF UT AH,

Case No.

12809

DefendantAppellant.

APP·ELLANT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Defendant-Appellant respectfully petitions the court, in
accordance with Rule 7 6 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to reconsider its opinion in this case, to grant a rehearing, and upon said reconsideration and rehearing to vacate
its prior decision, reverse the judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake County and remit the case with directions to
enter judgment for the defendant-appellant.
The decision should be reconsidered and a rehearing
granted for the following reasons:
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1. The Present Decision Conflicts With All Of The
Workmen's Compensation Cases Decided By This
Court In The Past.
2. There Are No Findings Of The Trial Court Which
Support Its Decision.
3. The Decision As Issued Runs Counter To Well
Established Concepts Of Workmen's Compensa.
tion Law.
ARGUMENT
1. THE PRESENT DECISION CONFLICTS
WITH ALL OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES DECIDED BY THIS
COURT IN THE PAST.
Of the many workmen's compensation cases decided by
this court one case, and only one, is cited in support of the
decision on the merits (paragraph 4, Slip Opinion). The
claim that that case, Powers*, is precedent for this decision will
not bear scrutiny.
Mr. Powers was a combat fireman. When the incidents
in question in his case arose, he was on a swing shift filling
in at various fire stations for other men who were off duty.
A fire alarm was received at the station where he was working,
the overhead lights went on automatically and a loud gong
began to ring. He then and shortly afterward noticed symptoms consistent with a heart attack. The medical panel found
no causation, and the Industrial Commission denied the claim.
This court reversed and said:
The law is well settled that the aggravation or
lighting of a pre-existing disease by an industrial acci*Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 U.2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967).
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dent is compensable and that an internal failure
brought about by exertion in the course of employment may be an accident within the meaning of the
act. (emphasis added)

Thus it is clear that the Powers case was decided on the
ground that the employee was in the course of employment
o.nd that an accident occurred at that time.
Judge Elton was at his home in his bedroom when the
fatal stroke occurred. He was not in the course of employment. The inescapable question is, Would the Powers case,
a 3-2 decision, have been decided differently if the symptoms
had occurred while he was at home in his bedroom?
No decision ever rendered at any time by this court affords support for the result reached in this case. The result
here is contrary to law and under no state of the facts or of
rhe findings can it be made to fit either the letter or the spirit
cf the statute nor be made to fit any judicial precedent.
2. THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH SUPPORT ITS DECISION.
The court's opinion in this case states that "The issue
presented by this appeal is therefore simply whether the
tindings of the lower court are supported by competent evidence" (paragraph 2, Slip Opinion). Findings? There are
no findings. What pass for findings 1 through 3 simply recite
uncontested, prosaic facts which no one ever disputed. The
heart of the case is glossed over in "finding" No. 4, which is
no finding at all, but the ultimate conclusion. The astounding part of that finding is the "or" in the middle! Come on,
District Court what's this "or" business in the middle? Either
'
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you find it or you don't. Since when are findings done in
tandem? That's like the home plate umpire saying, "You're
either safe or you're out."
There is no great enlightenment m that finding of the
lower court. \'\/hat did the court find happened to the judge)
It doesn't even find that he had a stroke, although the Slip
Opinion says he did. Did the accident which took him occur
on the job or at home? Where is the finding on this point!
\X'hat was it, anyhow, the accident which took him? \Y/hat did
the court find caused the stroke? Was whatever caused the
stroke an "accident" within the prior decisions of this courtl
If so, what does the language of Redman 1 at page 285 mean
when it says:
"In other words the claimant has not met the onus
of proving an 'accident' in the course of his employment that 'caused' the 'injury' of which he complains, which burden is his."

and what did Pintar" mean, saying:
"It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensation that
his disability be shown to result, not as a gradual
development because of the nature or conditions of
his work, but from an identifiable accident or accidents in the course of the employment."
and Carling' mean with this language, referring to the definition of "accident":
"However, such an occurrence must be distinguished
from gradually developing conditions which are
1 Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22
U.2d 398,
45-1P.2d283 (1960).
"Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 U.2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 ( 1963).
''Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 U.2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965) ·
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classified as occupational diseases and which are not
compensable except as provided in Chapter 2, of Tide
35 (Sections 35-2-1, et seq.), U.C.A. 1953."

Mr. Carling was on the job engaged in his employer's business, pounding air pipes with an air gun. Judge Elton was
at home in his bedroom.
There are no underlying findings of the trial court,
findings on matters in serious contention between the parties,
""hich support the legal conclusion that there was an accident,
or that if there was one, it arose out of the employment, or
arose in the course of the employment. The language of the
Slip Opinion (paragraph 4), states: "This court has preYiously determined that aggravation of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable and that an internal
failure brought about by exertion in the course of employment
may be an accident within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act." It is respectfully suggested that
the court erred in the assumption that there was any exertion
in the course of employment or any accident in this case.
3. THE DECISION AS ISSUED RUNS COUNTER TO WELL ESTABLISHED CONCEPTS OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
This case involves directly only the claim of a judge's
widow. However, the controlling language is the language
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Statute and this decision, sets a far-reaching precedent.
One can hardly forebear turning to the language of this
court in M & K Corporation, v. Industrial Commission, 112
U. 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), in which this court said,
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"However, where a disease is involved, even under the liberal
provision of our statute, we have refused to open the door to
<: recovery for all injuries, without any causal relationship
between the employment and the accident, . . . ". Does not
the present decision not only open the door but carefully re.
move it from its hinges and place it over in the corner?

SUMMARY
The decision issued by the court in this case is a departure both from judicial precedent and the clear language of
the statute. In the interests of justice it should be reconsidered and a rehearing should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
K. ROGER BEAN
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
190 So. Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, Utah 84041

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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